Sloman and h-consciousness

Resource type
Journal Article
Author/contributor
Title
Sloman and h-consciousness
Abstract
Sloman criticizes all existing attempts to define machine consciousness for being overly one-sided. He argues that such definition is not only unattainable but also unnecessary. The critique is well taken in part; yet, whatever his intended aims, by not acknowledging the non-reductive aspects of consciousness, Sloman, in fact, sides with the reductivist view.
Publication
International Journal of Machine Consciousness
Volume
02
Issue
01
Pages
23-26
Date
2010-06
Journal Abbr
Int. J. Mach. Conscious.
ISSN
1793-8430
Accessed
3/18/25, 7:53 AM
Library Catalog
Extra
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Co.
Citation
Boltuc, P. (2010). Sloman and h-consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 02(01), 23–26. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000242